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Professional Standards and Legal
INSARAG,
Standard
Setting:
FMTs, and International Disaster
Relief Volunteers
Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller, PhD*

ABSTRACT

This Article draws attention to the nascent efforts of
emergency medical personnel, convened under World Health
Organization auspices, to improve humanitarian health
responses following catastrophicnatural disasters. The Foreign
Medical Team Working Group (FMT-WG) is pursuing new
professional standards related to sectoral coordination,
classification and registration. As its approach has been
significantly influenced by the InternationalSearch and Rescue
Advisory Group's (INSARAG) prior advances in these areas,
INSARAG's contributions will first be highlighted. While more
atypical contributors to international lawmaking than
traditionallystudied, the efforts by both groups shed significant
light into the burgeoning InternationalDisaster Response Law
field. Two principle assertions here: that soft law-oriented
technical guidelines can address highly time-sensitive,
operational challenges related to transnationalrelief; and that
ongoing professional self-regulation within specific response
sectors may bolster state willingness to open its borders to
outside international relief, even in the absence of a formal
convention to do so.
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"They didn't bring much with them. They didn't bring any supplies,
they didn't bring water. They didn't bring food . .. They thought that
shelter would be provided - that all they had to do was show up and
say, 'I'm a doctor, where can I do surgery?' And it doesn't work like
that.

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years, a new field known as International
Disaster Response Law (IDRL) has emerged, seeking to address some
of the most pressing challenges related to cross-border relief following
natural disasters. Field literature highlights IDRL's marked paucity
of hard-law frameworks compared to other more established areas of
public international law, and its alternatively pronounced soft
character. 2 In addition to public, state-generated declarations,
resolutions, and other non-binding instruments, IDRL's soft-law
nucleus also embodies sector-based, highly technical professional
codes of conduct, handbooks, and guidelines. Yet scholars pay little
notice to the various agents of these professional guidelines and
standards and the respective strategies they have employed to
ameliorate the sundry issues pertaining to international disaster
response while enhancing international law in the process.
This study draws attention to the nascent efforts of emergency
medical personnel, convened under the auspices of the World Health
Organization's Global Health Cluster, to improve humanitarian
health responses following sudden onset natural disasters. The

1.

Amy Costello, Medical Volunteers Learn From Mistakes Made in Rush to

Haiti, PUB. RADIO INT'L (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10[http://perma.cc/9W56-BDZC]
12/medical-volunteers-learn-mistakes-made-rush-haiti
(archived Sept. 22, 2015).
2.
INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LAW AND LEGAL
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: A DESK STUDY 15 (2007) [hereinafter
IFRC DESK STUDY]; Andrea de Guttry, Surveying the Law, in INTERNATIONAL
DISASTER RESPONSE LAW 3, 36 (Andrea de Guttry et al. eds., 2012).
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Foreign Medical Team (FMT) Working Group is targeting several
problem areas by formulating operational guidelines related to FMT
coordination, classification, and registration. However, these
strategies are not exclusive to the emergency medical sector. Urban
search and rescue (USAR) practitioners, under the aegis of the
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), were
the first in the entirety of the international humanitarian system to
devise protocols of this nature, dating back to 1991.3 The FMT
Working Group participants openly acknowledge the strong influence
of INSARAG's approach and experience in shaping their own policy
proposals. Accordingly, a preliminary examination of INSARAG's
efforts will also be provided for contextual purposes.
While a twenty-year span separates the launches of the
INSARAG and FMT initiatives, it will be shown that both address
essentially the same operational challenge-bringing a semblance of
order and professionalism to the chaos-prone universe of large-scale,
cross-border humanitarian aid following catastrophic natural
disasters. The quest for professionalism within the larger system is a
central concern across the discipline, even for mainstay humanitarian
relief actors. 4 The added convergence of spontaneous, unaffiliated
volunteers from across the globe at the disaster site-a common
phenomenon to be introduced at the beginning of this study-further
complicates matters greatly.
Health professionals and urban search and rescue personnel
represent epistemic communities of highly specialized expertise.
These groups are more atypical contributors to international
lawmaking than traditionally studied. Yet their efforts shed light into
the IDRL field in myriad ways. Two principle assertions will be
highlighted here: that soft-law-oriented technical guidelines can
address highly time-sensitive, operational challenges faced by
responding and disaster-affected states related to transnational
relief; and that ongoing professional self-regulation within specific
disaster response sectors may bolster state confidence-and therefore
its willingness-to open its borders to outside international relief in
the future, even in the absence of a formal convention to do so.

3.
See Office of the U.N. Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), Inaugural
Meeting of the InternationalSearch and Rescue Advisory Committee (INSARAC), at 18 (Dec. 11-13, 1991), http://www.insarag.org/images/stories/Documents/SteeringGroup/1991INSARACInauguralMeeting-Documentation.pdf. [http://perma.cc/HP7667E5] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
4.
See PETER WALKER & CATHERINE Russ, PROFESSIONALISING THE
HUMANITARIAN SECTOR: A SCOPING STUDY, ENHANCED LEARNING & RESEARCH FOR

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 3 (2010), http://www.elrha.org/wpcontentuploads/2015/01/
Professionalising thehumanitarian sector.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EUN5-ALVC]
(archived Sept. 22, 2015) (reviewing the current state of professionalism in the
humanitarian sector).
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II. PART OF THE CURE BUT ALSO PART OF THE PROBLEM? "THE EPIC
MEGA-DISASTER," CONVERGENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL DISASTER
RESPONSE LAW
While disasters assume many forms-ranging from armed
conflict to the technological-sudden onset events caused by natural
hazards-including earthquakes, tsunamis, and typhoons-tend to
trigger a distinctive brand of international aid response not
experienced elsewhere in the humanitarian relief system. Their
unexpected nature and rapidly unfolding timescale generate a global
burst of public attention, far greater than slow onset natural crises
such as droughts or conflict-based humanitarian emergencies, both of
which may play out over years, if not decades. Rapid onset tragedies
stemming from the physical environment also tend to be more
"media-friendly" in that their causes are more easily grasped by news
consumers and the events typically produce attendant powerful
visual images.5 Further, there may even be an innate bias, resulting
in the public perception that the victims of natural disasters are less
at fault for their plight compared to those caught up in violence. 6
Commentators have lamented the pattern of an imbalanced
media coverage in favor of more dramatic natural disasters rather
than crises with more complex origins. The International Federation
of the Red Cross's 2005 World Disasters Report expressed its
frustration regarding the greater media appeal of the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami compared to other concurrent but underreported
humanitarian crises:
Disasters that are unusual yet explicable, and that cause considerable death or
destruction in accessible places which the audience is believed to care about,
get covered. Baffling stories get less attention . . . . Today, TV news is part

news and part entertainment. So it's understandable that sudden, dramatic
disasters like volcanoes or tsunamis are intensely newsworthy, whereas long7
drawn-out crises (difficult to describe, let alone film) are not.

Sudden onset events with significantly high death tolls and
destruction, or what the International Red Cross Federation's

5.
See ACTIVE LEARNING NETWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY & PERFORMANCE IN
HUMANITARIAN ACTION [ALNAP], "DON'T CHASE HEADLINES, CHASE GOOD QUALITY
NEWS ...
DON'T BE FIRST, BE ACCOUNTABLE": A NEW AGENDA FOR NEWS MEDIA AND

HUMANITARIAN AID 7-11 (2008), http://www.alnap.org/resource/5057 [http://perma.cc/
EL5P-S3DA] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
6.
Hanna Zagefka et al., Donating to Disaster Victims: Responses to Natural
and Humanly Caused Events, 41 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 361-62 (2011).
7.

INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, Humanitarian

Media Coverage in the Digital Age, in WORLD DISASTERS REPORT (2005),
http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/world-disasters-report/wdr2005/wdr2005---chapter-6-humanitarian-media-coverage-in-the-digital-age/
[http://perma.cc/XK
E9-RH5N] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
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Malcom Lucard termed the "epic mega-disasters," especially draw
media notice. 8 While small and medium size disasters are far more
common and cumulatively cost far more loss of life, it is the single,
highly deadly, catastrophic case-such as the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami, the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, or Typhoon Haiyan that struck
the Philippines in 2013-that garner the lion's share of global media
interest.9 Moreover, in the past decade, grassroots social media have
served to further draw the world's attention to specific episodes.
Photos, amateur videos, and emails circulated worldwide by
Europeans vacationing in tsunami-devastated areas in December
2004 signified a major turning point in citizen coverage of disasters in
the digital age; by the time of the 2010 Haitian quake, social media
technology such as Twitter, Facebook, and the crowdsourcing
platform Ushahidi were widespread and fundamentally shaping the
global public's understanding of unfolding events. 10
Regular, full-time international humanitarian practitioners,
including those associated with UN agencies and the major
nongovernmental relief organizations such as Doctors Without
Borders, CARE, and OXFAM, are guided by a professional, needsbased ethic, responding regardless of whether the popular news
outlets are paying attention or not. However, after extraordinary,
nature-based tragedies such as a devastating earthquake or
hurricane,
these professional humanitarians
suddenly find
themselves joined by a momentous flood of thousands of volunteers
similarly desiring to help. Recognized for decades in disaster
management circles as the process of "external convergence," the
impacted area is barraged by outside goods and materials (material

8.
Malcolm Lucard, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, MAG. INT'L RED CROSS & RED
CRESCENT MOVEMENT, 2011, at 2, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine201l12/
18-23.html [http://perma.cc/4DES-ZGS4] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
9.
See Yan Yan & Kim Bissell, The Sky Is Falling: Predictors of News
Coverage of Natural Disasters Worldwide, COMM. RESEARCH, Feb. 27, 2015, at 1
(discussing the media's disproportionate favor of major versus small natural disasters).
THE

10.
See GLENDA COOPER, FROM THEIR OWN CORRESPONDENT? NEW MEDIA AND
CHANGES IN DISASTER COVERAGE: LESSONS TO BE LEARNT 5 (2D11),

http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/From%20Their%200wn%2 OC
orrespondentO.pdf [http://perma.cclDS9C-ZTGA] (archived Sept. 22, 2015) (describing
aid workers' use of the power of social media to raise awareness and funds in Haiti);
Steve Outing, Taking Tsunami Coverage into their Own Hands, POYNTER (Jan. 6, 2005,
1:55 AM), http://www.poynter.org/uncategorized/29330/taking-tsunami-coverage-intotheir-own-hands/ [http://perma.cc/JG4X-97XT] (archived Sept. 22, 2015) ("[The 2004
tsunamis represent the point at which a major change takes place in the media
world."); ALEKSANDRA SARCEVIC ET AL., "BEACONS OF HOPE" IN DECENTRALIZED
COORDINATION: LEARNING FROM ON-THE-GROUND MEDICAL TWITTERERS DURING THE

2010
HAITI
EARTHQUAKE
47-56
(2012),
http://www.cs.colorado.edulusers/palen/Home/Crisis_
Informaticsfiles/Sarcevic-et-alHaitiMedicalTwitterers 1.pdf [http://perma.cc/4NM4-R25S] (archived Sept. 26, 2015)
(exploring the role of Twitter in medical coordination during the disaster response
following the Haiti earthquake).
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convergence), informational inquiries and offers of assistance
(informational convergence), and a significant influx of people
(physical convergence). The latter are motivated by a range of
impulses, from a genuine wish to assist to disaster voyeurism."
One category of volunteer who participates is part of an outer
ring of the more institutionalized humanitarian system, affiliated
with mainstay volunteer organizations such as the International
Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent 2 or part of an on-call
roster by national governments.1 3 Most in this volunteer subset will
have, at a minimum, training in the international disaster response
field and may further possess prior experience serving in such
contexts. Far more problematic, however, are arrivals who are
unattached to any disaster response organization or framework,
whether national or international. This group is referred to as the
"spontaneous" or "unaffiliated" volunteer, a phenomena common both
within solely domestic disasters (September 11th being a particularly
notable case) 14 as well as those that spark a significant international
response. This volunteer type may have no directly relevant skill sets
but still want to help by serving as drivers or by providing other basic
services. Alternatively, they may be professionals in their respective
fields at home, such as an emergency room nurse or a trauma
surgeon. The latter category may have offered their services to one of
the major humanitarian NGOs, but were rejected due to their lack of
international experience. These individuals instead choose to "selfdeploy."' 5 In extreme cases, they may be imposters who falsely
indicate they are professionally credentialed.

11.
BEHAVIOR

See generally CHARLES E. FRITZ & J.H. MATHEWSON,
SOCIAL CONTROL
IN DISASTERS: A PROBLEM IN

CONVERGENCE
29-60
(1957),

https://ia800304.us.archive.org/10/items/convergencebehavO0fritrich/convergencebehav
00fritrich.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCW4-XZ5Z] (archived Sept. 22, 2015) (discussing the
broad range of factors motivating convergence behavior).
12.
For a sample statement regarding the preference to have disaster relief
volunteers participate within the organized humanitarian network, please refer to the
United States Agency for International Development's Center for International
FAQ
page
at:
http://www.cidi.org/how-disaster-reliefDisaster
Information
works/faqs/#hideslide8p49 [http://perma.cc/5KWM-J7NY] (archived Oct. 11, 2015). A
list of relevant U.S. organizations working in this space is located on the InterAction
website:
http://www.interaction.org/member-directory?keywords=&field-issue-area_
tid%5B%5D=1239 [http://perma.cc/Z99S-V5FR] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
COPPOLA,
13.
DAMON
MANAGEMENT 496-498 (2015).

14.

INTRODUCTION

TO

INTERNATIONAL

DISASTER

See Seana Lowe & Alice Fothergill, A Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer

Behavior after September 11th, in BEYOND SEPTEMBER 11TH: AN ACCOUNT OF POST-

DISASTER RESEARCH 293, 294, 296-310 (2003); Lauren S. Fernandez et al.,
Spontaneous Volunteer Response to Disasters: The Benefits and Consequences of Good
Intentions, 4 J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 57, 57 (2006) (describing one type of volunteer as
"volunteers on an assigned resource").
15.
See Joshua Whittaker et al., A Review of Informal Volunteerism in
Emergencies and Disasters: Definition, Opportunities and Challenges, 13 INT'L J.
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While there are thousands of examples of spontaneous,
unattached volunteers rushing to disaster-impacted countries, the
following excerpt from a Time magazine employee's diary blog
captures the movement perfectly. The blog author, Lonny Vargas, a
production manager at the magazine, decided to personally respond
to the 2010 Haiti disaster, along with eleven fellow church members,
including "a restaurant manager, a school principal, an accountant, a
flight attendant and a truck driver."16 Vargas describes both the
impact of news coverage upon his impulsive decision to go to Haiti as
well as his personal recruitment of other spontaneous volunteers:
The news of the earthquake shook me to the core. I thought of the children
without parents, the parents who lost their children. The elderly, and the sick.
How could I sit do nothing? I wanted to put legs on my faith, and do something
for these people. When I got to work, I sent an email to about 15 guys asking if
they wanted to try to get in and help. About half a dozen guys immediately
expressed interest. Now, none of us knew anything about Haiti other than
where it was on a map. But one of our guys managed to find a contact at a
small missions fellowship in Barahona, Dominican Republic - 1.5 hours from
the Haitian border. By the time I called the number and talked to Lewis, our
team was up to 12-as it happens, the exact number Lewis could
7
accommodate.'

Thousands of doctors and nurses also came forward from around
the globe to participate in the Haiti response. Two-thirds of the
surgeons who volunteered from the United States had never
participated before in disaster relief.18 In another anecdotal example,
Andy Day, an anesthesiologist, and his wife, Jennifer Day, a nurse,
volunteered to assist in Haiti after watching a charity telethon,
though neither had ever worked at a hospital outside of the United
States.' 9 The Indiana couple's motivation to help was again spurred
by the images coming out of Haiti: "[W]hat really caught the couple's
attention were the pictures of the kids-bandaged and bleeding,
missing limbs. The Days decided they could not sit by as mere
http://www.sciencedirect.com/
REDUCTION
358
(2015),
DISASTER
RISK
science/article/piilS2212420915300388 [http://perma.cclD3EJ-VGKA] (archived Oct. 11,
2015); Mary Merrill, The New Unaffiliated Volunteers, WORLD VOLUNTEER WEB (Mar.
22, 2005), at 1-2, http://www.worldvolunteerweb.org/news-views/viewpoints/doc/thenew-unaffiliated-volunteers.html [http://perma.cc/T76H-E268] (archived Sept. 22,
2015) (discussing volunteers turned down by international agencies who then take
matters into their own hands to volunteer how, when, and where they want).
16.
Deirdre Van Dyk, Introduction, Out of Faith and Compassion: Diary of a
Haiti Volunteer, TIME (Jan. 30, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/
article/0,28804,1953379_1953494_1957869,00.html
[http://perma.cclB7RX-4Z7S]
(archived Sept. 22, 2015).
17.
Lonny Vargas, Out of Faith and Compassion: Diary of a Haiti Volunteer,
Time (Jan. 30, 2010), at 1, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/
0,28804,1953379_1953494_1957869,00.html
[http://perma.cc/3FRF-4Z67]
(archived
Sept. 22, 2015).
18.
Costello, supranote 1, at 4.
19.
Id. at 1-2.
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observers of the suffering. Before they knew it Andy and Jennifer
landed in Port-au-Prince. Almost immediately, Jennifer had second
thoughts." Later when the Days were asked about which organization
they were affiliated with, Andy Day had to reply that: "There wasn't a
name. It was a friend of a friend." 20
The challenges posed by the incoming flood of spontaneous
volunteers to the disaster site are wide-ranging and well-documented,
not only in relation to Haiti and other mega disasters, including the
2004 Tsunami, but in most major natural disasters going back to the
1980s, as will be shown shortly with INSARAG. Their arrival sets off
a chain of complications for the relief effort, some even deadly.
International disaster response, even when limited to professional
networks, is a massively human-intensive operation. A further flood
of unexpected volunteers creates an immense aid bottleneck at border
entry points into the stricken state. Many unaffiliated volunteers
arrive without self-sufficiency and proper vaccinations for endemic
diseases, further burdening an already stressed local response
capacity and draining supplies from international providers meant
for the local victims of the crisis. 21 Many come without language
skills or any familiarity with the country's culture. 22 They may
misrepresent credentials or have ones ill-suited to international
emergency contexts, causing additional suffering and physical harm
to the victims.2 3 Volunteers also raise significant issues regarding

&

20.
Id. at 7; see also Patrick Barta, Dropping Everything, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
http://www.wsj.comlarticles/SB1 12691877231043862
2005,
at
1-2,
[http://perma.cc/PMM5-UB8U] (archived Sept. 22, 2015) (detailing the work of an
unattached volunteer in Sri Lanka after the tsunami); David Montero, US Volunteers
Find PakistanMore Friendly Than Feared, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 23, 2005, at
2-3, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1123/pOlsOl-wose.html [http://perma.cc/ D9CTAHCU] (archived Sept. 22, 2015) (discussing the work of both affiliated and unattached
volunteers in Pakistan).
21.
See JoNel Aleccia, Disaster Do-Gooders Can Actually Hinder Help,
NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.nbenews.comlid/34958965/ns/world-news[http://perma.cc/
haiti/t/disaster-do-gooders-can-actually-hinder-help#.VVyRipXbKM8
PD7Y-XFAGI (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
22.
See id.
23.
See Raina M. Merchant et al., Health Care Volunteers and Disaster
Response-First, Be Prepared, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 872, 872-73 (2010); Daniel J.
Van Hoving et al., Haiti Disaster Tourism-A Medical Shame, 25 PREHOSPITAL
DISASTER MED. 201, 202 (2010); Aleccia, supra note 21, at 1-2; Jamie Aten, How
Churches Can Help Without Hurting After Super Typhoon Haiyan, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2013/november-web[http://perma.cc/5G36-4AMF]
only/how-to-help-after-super-typhoon-haiyan.html
(archived Sept. 22, 2015); Barta, supra note 19; Costello, supra note 1, at 4-7; William
Weir, Disaster Tourists: Volunteers Advised to be with a Group, or They May Get in the
Way, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 12, 2005), http://articles.courant.com/2005-0912/features/0509100243_1_lisaster-team-relief-effort-disaster-sites
[http://perma.cc/DTU3-QYMM] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
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liability, insurance coverage, and other major points of domestic
law. 24
There have been significant and multifaceted reform initiatives
pertaining to the provision of international relief over the past
twenty-five years, as well as attendant efforts to organize and
strengthen national and international legal frameworks related to
disaster response. The United Nations, where much of international
humanitarian assistance coordination is nested, has come a long way
since the landmark passage of UNGA Resolution 46/182: "Resolution
on strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian
assistance of the United Nations," which marked a sharp operational
and organizational departure for the world body. Passed in December
1991, 46/182, along with a major set of further reforms undertaken in
2005, have led to the creation of many of the relief mechanisms
associated with the United Nations today including the Department
of Humanitarian Affairs (later United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs or UNOCHA), the position of
the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC), the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF),
the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), and the Cluster Approach,
establishing sectoral leadership during relief efforts. 25 On the NGO
side of the international humanitarian equation, there have also been
several substantive ventures related to professional quality standardsetting among the major nongovernmental providers, including,
principally among them (by the year they were introduced), Code of
Conduct for the InternationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Movement
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in disaster relief (1994),
People in Aid's Code of Best Practice (1997), the Sphere Standards
(1999) and its most recent iteration Core HumanitarianStandardon
Quality and Accountability (2014), and the Humanitarian
Accountability Project (HAP) International Standards (2005).26

24.
See INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTEERING IN EMERGENCIES 29-54 (2011), http://www.ifrc.org/
PageFiles/125640/legalframework.pdf [http://perma.cc/HY2H-9RF6] (archived Sept. 22,
2015) (discussing liability issues that often arise in the emergency volunteer context
and legislation enacted addressing this liability); Sharif Elgafi, Medical Liability in
HumanitarianMissions, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 3-6 (2014), https://sites.tufts.
edu/jhalarchives/2111 [https://perma.cc/GUE9-HN4J] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
Andrej Zwitter, United Nations' Legal Framework of Humanitarian
25.
Assistance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: A CROSSCUT
THROUGH LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO HUMANITARIANISM 51, 51, 55-60 (Hans-

Joachim Heintze et al. eds., 2011); PETER WALKER & DANIEL MAXWELL, SHAPING THE
HUMANITARIAN WORLD 104-08 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 2009).
26.
See WALKER & MAXWELL, supra note 25, at 129-35; JOHN COSGRAVE,
JOINT STANDARDS

INITIATIVE, HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS-TOO

MUCH OF A GOOD

THING? 1-2 (2013), http://pool.fruitycms.com/humanitarianstandards/Humanitarian-
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While these undertakings by the United Nations and the leading
relief NGOs have incrementally improved disaster relief within the
established networks of humanitarian providers (although that still
remains a work in progress), neither of these directly address the
issue of converging unaffiliated volunteers and the quality challenges
they may pose. IDRL, a field barely into its third decade, is currently
engaging in a delicate balancing act on this issue in several
directions. On the surface, the legal framework appears up to the
task; through the exercise of their sovereignty, states can determine
who enters their country via the enforcement of visa regulations,
licensure, and other domestic regulations for personnel crossing their
borders. Yet, for numerous reasons, particularly in the wake of
natural disasters, many governments are not in a position to
appropriately manage a significant inflow of external actors.
Coordination in every direction is a struggle as De Siervo writes:
The national institutions in charge of coordinating post-disaster operations
usually have to deal with a very challenging environment; infrastructures are
often seriously damaged; coordinators are often personally affected by the
event; the high pressure by the public opinion and the media is constant.
Moreover, authorities usually have limited knowledge and understanding of
the complexity, culture, policies, procedures, and working mechanisms of
27
international relief organizations, and vice versa.

In such circumstances, states may not consistently enforce or may
waive their rules altogether governing entry and credentials. 28
To date, the significant concerns of the international
humanitarian community have actually been in the opposite
direction. For example, host states' overly restrictive laws and
bureaucratic processes impede or block the entrance of relief workers
into the impacted country. Further, few domestic frameworks are in
place for expedited recognition of foreign professional credentials
during times of emergencies. 29 These concerns were actually the
genesis of the Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation
of internationaldisaster relief and initial recovery assistance adopted
by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in
2007, which is considered to be the international model for ideal
practices in this area. 30 However, the Federation also recognizes that
standards-too-much-of-a-good-thing-John-Cosgrave-Feb-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/BP7
Y-SCWXI (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
27.
Giovanni De Siervo, Actors, Activities, and Coordinationin Emergencies, in
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAW 485, 488-89 (Andrea de Guttry et al. eds.,
2012).
IFRC DESK STUDY, supra note 2, at 119.
28.
Stefano Silingardi, The Status of Emergency Workers, in INTERNATIONAL
29.
DISASTER RESPONSE LAW 551, 559-69 (Andrea de Guttry et al. eds., 2012); IFRC DESK
STUDY, supranote 2, at 118.
30.
INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, INTRODUCTION TO
THE GUIDELINES FOR THE DOMESTIC FACILITATION AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
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too much looking the other way by the state involved in a national
disaster invites its own share of risks, as IFRC's defining desk study
on IDRL explains: "For affected persons, a lack of effective control,
particularly over medical services, raises an elevated potential for
sub-standard assistance. For example, after the 2004 tsunami, teams
of Scientologists responded in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and India to
perform their modern version of faith healing on affected persons." 31
Developing an approach that simultaneously addressed concerns
with professional standards and built trust with disaster-impacted
states pertaining to cross-border assistance came from a highly
surprising corner of the international humanitarian community.
USAR personnel were the first to develop what ultimately became a
sophisticated set of sector-based protocols that would ultimately be
globally endorsed by states via the UN General Assembly and become
a model for other providers regarding the professionalization of
international relief. As will be shown, it was not a process that
happened overnight, but efforts by what ultimately became known as
the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group built a strong
scaffolding upon which the humanitarian health sector could recently
begin to fashion a remedy for the plethora of issues within its own
community.

III. PROFESSIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER RESPONSE: THE

"INSARAG MODEL"
INSARAG's origins date back to the 1980s, with the dawning of
the mass casualty age due to high-rise building collapse. Worldwide,
growing urbanization coupled with a massive construction surge led
to the appearance of high occupancy dwellings frequently comprised
of seismically vulnerable pre-cast concrete. 32 Further, construction
standards in the Global South, where many megacities began
emerging, were often undermined by cheap building materials, weak
government regulation, and marked corruption. 33
Together, the catastrophic 1985 Mexico City and 1988 Soviet
Armenia earthquakes exhibited this emerging new reality of human
vulnerability. They also demonstrated the total absence of domestic
or international response capacity specifically designed to rescue
DISASTER RELIEF AND INITIAL RECOVERY ASSISTANCE

8 (2011), http://www.ifrc.org/

PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%2oGuidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf [http://perma.cc/C2H
G-QY96] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
31.
IFRC DESK STUDY, supra note 2, at 119.
32.
See ROBERT RHEA & BRIAN ROUSSEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF TECHNICAL
RESCUE 131-34 (2009).
See Andrew C. Revkin, DisasterAwaits Cities in Earthquake Zones, N.Y.
33.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/science/earthl25quake.
html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/9CEM-N3Z3] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
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individuals caught in building collapses.34 At the same time, the rise
of cable television news drew instant global attention to both events,
producing a strong international audience interest in disaster
coverage. 5
Galvanized by the powerful visuals coming out of both events,
individuals with varying levels and forms of search and rescue
experience began to converge upon the devastated areas. With no
formal intake procedures at points of entry, it is estimated that
volunteers from nine countries ultimately deployed to Mexico,
including a mix of personnel from local fire services, national military
units, and citizen search dog groups as well as specialists from the
private sector, each with their own variations of training, equipment,
and technologies. 36 The United States, for instance, sent regular
firefighters and paramedics, but also U.S. Forest Service fire response
units, mining search and rescue personnel, heavy demolition workers
and private search dog teams. 37 Many international teams did not
arrive until almost fifty-six hours after the quake had struck.38
Beyond deployment challenges, more vital hours were lost due to the
total confusion as to which sites had been searched, heated on-site
arguments between national teams regarding protocols and
strategies, communications challenges, training differences, and
insufficient equipment. 9 The disarray repeated itself in Armenia
three years later, with international USAR teams continuing to

34.
For a detailed treatment of the rise of international urban search and
rescue in relation to the Mexico City and Armenia earthquakes, see Kirsten Nakjavani
Bookmiller, The InternationalLaw of 96 Hours: Urban Search and Rescue Teams and
the Current State of InternationalDisasterResponse Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF DISASTER RELIEF 111, 115-121 (David Caron et al. eds., 2014).
See Michael J. Robinson, Two Decades of American News Preferences, Part
35.
2: News Interest Across Decades and "News Eras", PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE
PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Aug. 22, 2007, at 5, http://www.pewresearch.org/files/old(archived
[http://perma.cc/8ZD5-LFG9]
assets/pdflNewslnterestl986-2007Part2.pdf
Sept. 22, 2015).
36.
Louise K. Comfort, International Disaster Assistance in the Mexico City
Earthquake, FMHI PUBS., 1986, at 15-16; see also Lionel Barber, World Ready to Help
If Mexico Makes Request: Let's Assess the Need,' Envoy Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 21,
1985, at A18; Edward Cody, Rescue Workers Dig for Quake Survivors, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1985, at Al; Paul Knox, Mexican President Faces Criticism as Rescue Teams
Race Against Time, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 23, 1985, at 1-2.
37.
George Lardner, Jr., Donations to Agencies Favored in Quake Relief Halt
to Gifts of Food and Clothing Urged, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1985, at A18; see also U.S.
EMBASSY-MEXICO

CITY,

FINAL

DISASTER

SUMMARY

REPORT

MEXICO-1985

EARTHQUAKE 27 (1986).
38.
Comfort, supranote 36, at 23.
39.
RESPONSE

See E.L. QUARANTELLI, UNIV. OF DEL. RESEARCH CTR., ORGANIZATIONAL
TO THE MEXICO CITY EARTHQUAKE OF 1985: CHARACTERISTICS AND

IMPLICATIONS 10 (1992); Paul Knox, Canadian Rescuers Thwarted in Bid to Find
Victims, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 25, 1985, at 1; Paul Knox, Hopes Fade for
Survivors in Mexico's Quake Chaos, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 25, 1985, at 3.

20151

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND LEGAL STANDARD SETTING

969

arrive far outside the survivability window with wildly uneven levels
of training and no cross-team cooperation. 40 Concluding that external
search and rescue teams were responsible for less than 1 percent of
live rescues during the Armenian disaster, 41 the sector was urged to
take action. 42 In 1989, UNDRO convened an inaugural meeting of
national emergency managers and diplomats in Geneva to examine
nine problematic areas of international disaster relief, with search
and rescue activities included among them. 4 3
Out of this gathering would ultimately emerge INSARAG, a
transgovernmental network of subnational and national emergency
management
practitioners, currently
headquartered in the
Emergency Services Branch of UNOCHA in Geneva.
Under UN auspices, INSARAG has, since its inception, sought to
strengthen coordination and standardization among internationally
certified teams, reduce the number of volunteers without appropriate
training or credentials and build international community confidence
that external USAR is a value-added resource worthy of supporting.
The group has achieved these interrelated goals with a
multidimensional strategy. In addition to the creation of the On-Site
Operations Coordination Center, which will be discussed in tandem
with INSARAG's classification process below, another track has been
the drafting and ongoing revision of the INSARAG Guidelines and
Methodology. First endorsed in June 1999 as the "International
Search and Rescue Guidelines" (ISARR), 44 the document is a living
handbook for the transnational USAR community and sending and
host governments. It is dedicated to establishing a common term of
reference for international responders, whose primary job is to work
in national search and rescue contexts. 45 The latest revision was

40.
Charles Krimgold, Search and Rescue, 5 EARTHQUAKE SPECTRA 136, 142
(Aug. 1989).
41.
Eric K. Noji et al., Issues of Rescue and Medical Care Following the 1988
Armenian Earthquake, 22 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1070, 1070 (1993).
42.
See PETER WALKER, LEAGUE OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES,
INTERNATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAMS: A LEAGUE DISCUSSION PAPER 26-29

(1991), http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/docum/crid/Abril-Mayo2005/CD2/pdf/eng/docl375/
doc1375-contenido.pdf [http://perma.ccl6YCL-52JM] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
Office of the U.N. Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), Third Meeting of
43.
Officials in Charge of National Emergency Relief Services (NERS III): FinalReport, at
11, UNDRO/89/20 (Oct. 19-20, 1989), http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/pdf/eng/docl794/
docI794-contenido.pdf [http://perma.cc/69NL-256W] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
44.
U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS [OCHA],
INTERNATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE RESPONSE: MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL SEARCH
AND RESCUE TEAM LEADERS ON LESSONS LEARNT AND FOLLOW UP TO THE 1999 TURKEY
AND TAIWAN EARTHQUAKES 4 (1999).

45.
See INT'L SEARCH & RESCUE ADVISORY GRP., INSARAG GUIDELINES
VOLUME 1: POLICY 5 (2015), http://www.insarag.org/images/stories/INSARAG
GuidelinesV1_Policy1.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PTN-7QCY] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
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undertaken in 2015.46 The group also drew global attention to its
efforts by pursuing the December 2002 passage of UNGA Resolution
57/150: "Strengthening the Effectiveness and Coordination of
International Urban Search and Rescue Assistance." The resolution
accomplished multiple objectives simultaneously, including officially
recognizing INSARAG and promoting wider state participation in its
efforts, urging disaster affected states to simplify border control
procedures, recognizing the responsibility of USAR contributing
states in deploying suitable teams and officially endorsing the

INSARAG Guidelines.
However, it was INSARAG's launch of its International External
Classification process in 2005 that truly broke new ground in the
world of international disaster relief and serves as a highly
influential template for later efforts by the humanitarian health
sector.4 7 The premise behind the IEC is based on a search and rescue
maxim that has continued through to the present day: the greatest
proportion of live rescues will happen in the first twenty-four hours
by the local inhabitants. 48 Those extricated during this period are
typically closer to the surface and do not require sophisticated skill
sets and equipment. 49 Therefore, what the impacted country really
needs by the time external USAR personnel arrive are the advanced
teams trained in highly technical rescues and possessing specialized
equipment.
Prior to 2005,
teams "self-classified"
themselves when
submitting their materials to be included in the international USAR
directory relied upon by OCHA.50 The subsequent decision to
implement the peer-review classification process was an attempt to
sift out search and rescue teams who would simply replicate local
capacity or had no actual capacity at all. 5 1 The IEC Guidelines
identify three classifications: "light," "medium," and "heavy." The
categories vary depending on a number of elements, including the
location of victims requiring USAR, building material involved, level

46.
Id. at 4.
See Bookmiller, supra note 34, at 127.
47.
See, e.g., Michael E. Durkin, et al., The Survival of People in Collapsed
48.
Buildings, DISASTER CHRONICLES, 1985, at 32-39; Osamu Kunii et al., The Medical
and Public Health Response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Japan:A Case
Study in Disaster Planning, 2 MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL 214, 223-24 (1995); Anthony
Macintyre et al., Surviving Collapsed Structure Entrapment After Earthquakes: A
"Time-to-Rescue"Analysis, 21 PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED. 4, 8 (2006).
49.
See Macintyre et al., supranote 48, at 8.
EXTERNAL
50.
INT'L SEARCH & RESCUE ADVISORY GRP., INSARAG
CLASSIFICATION/RECLASSIFICATION (IECIR) HANDBOOK 7 (2012) [hereinafter INSARAG
HANDBOOK], https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/IEC-R%20Handbook%20201
2%2OEdition.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZ2F-TPMZ] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
51.
See Arjun Katoch, The Responders' Cauldron: The Uniqueness of
InternationalDisasterResponse, 59 COLUM. J. INT'L AFF. 153, 167-68 (2006).
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of medical expertise required, ability to mobilize quickly, required
length of continuing operations, self-sufficiency, scope and
sophistication of equipment, and depth of personnel expertise. The
"light" designation applies to first responders who have the ability to
assist victims lightly trapped or close to the surface and who are
typically reached in the hours right after the event takes place. 52
These rescuers, on average, are either from the country impacted or
from neighboring states. 53 USAR teams who meet the requirements
of the "medium" or "heavy" classification must demonstrate best
practices in five areas: management, logistics, search, rescue, and
medical. 54 Personnel in these categories are trained to respond to
highly complex and technical rescues. 55 The highest classification of
"heavy" means that the team already contains expertise in locating
the "deeply entombed" in structures with reinforced steel, possesses
the ability to search at two sites simultaneously, has built-in capacity
to locate victims with both search dogs and technology, has
proficiency in both heavy rigging and lifting, and able to be selfsufficient for and conduct continuous twenty-four hour operations for
up to ten days at two different sites. In addition, they must have the
capability to be on-site and operational within forty-eight hours.5 6
National teams who achieve the medium or heavy classification
understand that they must respect the authority of the Local
Emergency Management Authority and participate through the UN
OCHA coordination mechanisms, including the On-Site Operations
Coordination Center (OSOCC) mechanism and the United Nations
Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) process.57 OSOCC,
the first initiative pursued by INSARAG in the 1990s, provides a
central rendezvous point for incoming international USAR teams.5 8
The OSOCC's Reception and Departure Centers (RDCs), typically
located at designated entry points in the disaster-stricken country,
are responsible for proactively addressing issues that may impede the
successful deployment of USAR personnel, including customs and
immigration, transportation logistics, and interpretation support.5 9

52.

INT'L SEARCH & RESCUE ADVIsoRY GRP., INSARAG GUIDELINES VOLUME

II: PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, CHAPEAU, MANUAL A: CAPACITY BUILDING 34 (2015)

[hereinafter INSARAG GUIDELINES VOL. II], http://www.insarag.org/images/stories/
INSARAG-Guidelines-V2_ChapeauManual_A--Capacity-Buildingl.pdf [http://perm
a.cc/4STL-8KRN] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
53.
See id. at 33.
54.
See INSARAG HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 7-9.
55.
See id.
56.
INSARAG GUIDELINES VOL. II, supranote 52, at 35-36.
57.
See U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, ONSITE OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTRE (OSOCC) GUIDELINES 11 (2014) [hereinafter
ON-SITE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES].

58.
59.

See id. at 9-11.
Id. at 14, 33-41.
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The RDC is also tasked with registering incoming teams and
conveying their status to the OSOCC. 60 As personnel exit the country,
the RDC conducts a debriefing, logs their departure and works to
resolve any outstanding matters.6 1 Both the RDC and the OSOCC are
set up either by the first USAR team to arrive in country, or by
representatives from the UNDAC team.62 UNDAC is a corresponding
rapid response mechanism, involving a global roster of national and
IGO-affiliated emergency management officials who mobilize quickly
and assist the affected country in articulating its needs and
coordinating the influx of global relief when appropriate.6 3 For
countries willing to accept UN-facilitated external aid in the wake of
a disaster, the establishment of an OSOCC is now standard operating
procedure across the humanitarian system during a large-scale
international relief operation, and the efforts have paid off according
to several studies.64 As long-time UN humanitarian affairs official
Arjun Katoch explains, "[i]t simultaneously established a process for
mutual assessment of international USAR team operational
capabilities and made it clear that light USAR teams should not
respond internationally as they lack adequate operational
capability."6 5

IV. REPLICATING THE "INSARAG MODEL" IN THE HUMANITARIAN
HEALTH SECTOR: WHO AND FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAMS
Like USAR personnel, emergency medical professionals may also
be domestic-based emergency service providers who may deploy on an
episodic basis to international disasters. As with international USAR,
especially in its formative stages, the sector frequently attracts
volunteers that either possess expertise ill-suited for the impacted
country's demonstrated needs or little training at all. In 2011, the
World Health Organization (WHO) (in conjunction with the Global
Health Cluster) established a new working group focusing on
classification, standard setting, and registration procedures for
Foreign Medical Teams.66 WHO was galvanized to act after numerous

Id. at 14.
60.
Id. at 39-41.
61.
Id. at 14.
62.
63.
What is UNDAC?, OCHA, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordinationtools/undac/overview [http://perma.cclQ88Q-2AMU] (archived Sept. 27, 2015).
64.

See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

[OCHA], HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW 36 (2005) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE REVIEW], https://interagencystandingeommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/
HRR.pdf [https://perma.cefU9HS-QWNA] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
65.
Katoch, supra note 51, at 167.
66.

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL HEALTH

CLUSTER MEETING REPORT 15-16 (2011), http://www.who.int/hac/global_healthcluster/
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problems were observed during the responses to the 2010 Haitian
earthquake and Pakistan floods in terms of training levels,
professionalism, and coordination among arriving medical personnel
from abroad.6 7
After the wave of complex humanitarian emergencies in 1990s,
the health community was coming to terms with a dynamic that did
not exist for the urban search and rescue sector. While USAR was
deployed primarily to sudden onset disasters caused by earthquakes,
foreign medical personnel served both crises with a significant
violence element as well those that were hazards based, and one size
did not fit all on the humanitarian health front. As Rony Brauman
writes: "The most widespread misinterpretation is that natural
disasters produce the same type of consequences as armed conflicts.
They do not."68 Brauman identifies several key differences that
completely shape the nature of the outside medical response required.
Natural disasters are more likely to impact a specific geographic
region, leaving the majority of the emergency medical provision intact
and therefore necessitating an in-country stay shorter in duration. 69
Wars, on the other hand, affect a much larger area, damage hospitals
and prompt the flight of local medical professionals. 70 The displaced
populations may also be malnourished and, therefore, more
vulnerable to epidemics, which is not necessarily a primary
characteristic of natural disaster contexts. 7
As early as 1999, in the wake of Hurricanes Georges (1998) and
Mitch (1999), the Pan American Health Organization's (PAHO) report
on the respective international responses affirm these important
distinctions and their implications for external medical provision. 72 In
its section on emergency medical care related to the two quakes, the
findings and recommendations
parallel
INSARAG's
earlier
experiences and also presage the very concerns that WHO's FMT
initiative would wrestle with over ten years later. The report noted:
(1) due to the lag time in international responders reaching impacted
communities, local, regional, and national providers were the primary
about/globalhealth_cluster.report_23march2Oll.pdfua=1
Y] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
67.

[http://perma.cc/BZH8-AG3

FOREIGN MED. TEAM WORKING GRP., WORLD HEALTH ORG., Humanitarian

Health Action: Improving the Quality of Surgical Trauma Care After Sudden Onset
Disasters, http://www.who.int/hac/globalhealthcluster/fmt/en/ [http://perma.cc/3G5TC5DCI (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
68.
Rony Brauman, Global Media and the Myths of HumanitarianRelief The
Case of the 2004 Tsunami, in HUMANITARIANISM AND SUFFERING: THE MOBILIZATION

OF EMPATHY 108, 110 (Richard Ashby Wilson & Richard D. Brown eds., 2d ed. 2011).
Id.
69.
70.
Id.
Id.
71.
72.
See PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: MEETING ON EVALUATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO

HURRICANES GEORGES AND MITCH 11-12 (1999).

974

VANDERBILT]OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 48:957

emergency medical care providers; (2) the arrival of a wave of "foreign
medical brigades" after the initial aftermath-many whose services
were no longer required-placed a significant burden upon, and
therefore diverted the attention of the local authorities from
articulating its most pressing post-disaster needs; (3) foreign medical
teams could be useful in the "medium term" in specialty areas once
needs were assessed by the local authorities but should only come at
the request of the impacted country; and (4) those teams that would
participate in the response must be self-sufficient in terms of
logistical and technical support as well as take appropriate
precautions regarding the introduction of diseases not endemic in the
host country. 73
Again echoing many of the themes faced by international USAR,
Claude de Ville de Goyet, assessing the international medical
response to the 1999 Marmara earthquake, challenged the
conventional wisdom of the time both in light of what transpired in
Turkey and the earthquakes in the Americas:
[O]nly a handful of survivors owe their lives to foreign teams. Most survivors
owe their lives to neighbours and local authorities. When foreign medical teams
arrive, most of the physically accessible injured have already received some
medical attention. Western medical teams are not necessarily most appropriate
to the local conditions. Many will have found that press coverage of the Turkey
earthquake created a sense of d6jA vu: international rescue teams rushing in
were made to look as though they were saving victims neglected by
74
incompetent or corrupt local authorities.

The 2005 Humanitarian Response Review, commissioned by
UNOCHA in the months before the December Pakistan earthquake of
the same year, warned that a massive influx of emergency medical
personnel post-disaster, many with highly variable levels of training,
was shaking the confidence of impacted governments: "In recent
years, organizations are reporting more and more scepticism among
authorities, when bringing in expatriate health personnel, especially
in relation to professional quality and skills, and compatibility with
75
national regulations."
International volunteer medical responses during the arc of
natural disasters beginning with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
through the 2010 Haitian earthquake further solidified the
substantial criticisms of such assistance both pertaining to their
quality and necessity. Dissatisfaction amongst governments and

73.
See id. at 21-22.
74.
Claude de Ville de Goyet, Stop Propagating Disaster Myths, 16
HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE MAG. 8 (March 2000), http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarianexchange-magazine/issue-16/stop-propagating-disaster-myths
[http://perma.cc/G44YTEAJ] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
75.

HuMANImTARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW, supra note 64, at 32.

2015]

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND LEGAL STANDARD SETTING

975

within the international humanitarian health community itself
focused on several interrelated problem areas. First, the numbers of
outside professional medical teams and volunteers often far exceeded
the assessed need of the impacted country and many arrived too late
following the "golden period."76 Following the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami, Thailand, due to a variety of favorable circumstancesincluding that many of its high quality medical facilities were left
largely unaffected by the disaster-required no outside medical
assistance nor did Bangkok request any. However, a wealthy donor
state still sent a medical team of ten personnel, a typical reaction
which the Thai government found "patronizing," according to WHO's
in-country coordinator.77
Second, thousands of volunteers, unaffiliated with the major
international
emergency
medical
providers,
arrived
with
inappropriate credentials and supplies related to the specific needs
landscape and little or no training in international disaster response,
including being unfamiliar with the international humanitarian
assistance infrastructure such as the role of UNOCHA or the Cluster
System. 78 Moreover, some arrived with no actual professional
credentials at all.79 In all cases, the influx of such individuals further
stressed already overburdened domestic and international system
response capacities. 80 An experienced member of the Mount Sinai
Hospital medical team, which had joined the Haiti-based organization
Partners in Health to participate in the Haitian response, explained
what he observed:
With healthcare facilities in tatters, the needs were the greatest for traumatrained personnel, emergency medical staff, and other practitioners who could
perform under the most difficult circumstances. A surgeon who exclusively
practices minimally invasive or robotic surgery would be of little use in these
circumstances . . . . Similarly, there is very little that can be accomplished in a
disaster theater by a lone healthcare volunteer who does not embed himself or
herself into an appropriate relief organization. In addition to the challenges of

76.
See Natacha Emerson et al., First 30 days: Organizing Rapid Responses,
20 PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED. 420, 420-421 (2005).
77.
Jonathan Watts, Thailand Shows The World It Can Cope Alone, 365
LANCET 284, 284 (2005).
78.
Ezra Fieser & Sara Miller Llana, HaitiEarthquake Anniversary: The State
of Global Disaster Relief, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.
csmonitor.com/WorldlGlobal-Issues/2011/0111/Haiti-earthquake-anniversary-the-stateof-global-disaster-relief [http://perma.ec/43XV-8TZ6] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
79.
See Van Hoving et al., supra note 23, at 202.
80.
See CLAUDE DE VILLE DE GOYET ET AL., PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. [PAHO],
HEALTH RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE IN HAITI: LESSONS To BE LEARNED FOR THE

NEXT MASSIVE SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTER 111-36 (Jan. 2010); Ernest Benjamin et al.,
Principles and Practice of DisasterRelief Lessons from Haiti, 78 MOUNT SINAI J. MED.
306, 314 (2011); Van Hoving et al., supra note 23, at 201-02; Fieser & Llana, supra
note 78.
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finding something useful to do, there are the difficult problems of credentials
vetting and logistics such as local transportation, lodging, and safety.8 1

Furthermore, foreign medical personnel frequently failed to
respect local medical personnel, culture, and protocols. One study
related to malaria control in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami
showed that while local authorities had an operational plan, the
presence of 600 foreign doctors independently operating their own
camps and implementing their own protocols and medical treatments
negatively impacted the domestic monitoring system in place. 82
During the response on the Indonesian island of Aceh, local medical
personnel were essentially frozen out of their own hospital facilities
by outside medical relief workers according to an Indonesian medical
doctor:
International medical responders, for example, brought their own equipment
and set up small mobile hospitals, but later found they required facilities in
existing hospitals. Consequently, many demanded exclusive use and control of
hospital wards. An operation theater in Meulaboh, for example, was
"controlled" by international medical teams who shared the facility with each
other on a rotational basis. As a result, some Indonesian doctors lost access to
both their facilities and patients. 83
In Haiti, volunteers performed medical procedures used
elsewhere for limb amputation that were ill-suited for the open air
conditions in which many of the treated would be recovering. 84 Even
internationally sensitive medical professionals may struggle with the
substantive differences in medical approaches in differing national
contexts, attempting to reconcile divergent systems for patient care
and support, and pursuing what they may believe is the best
approach to medical treatment in what may be in contrary to local
85
practices.
While less egregious from a life-saving perspective, medical
providers without sensitivity to the broader cultural landscape has
also been an issue. On the island of Aceh in 2004, many medical
personnel serving a population traumatized by decades of violence

Benjamin, supra note 80, at 314.
81.
Olivier Brieit et al., Maps of the Sri Lanka MalariaSituation Preceding the
82.
Tsunami and Key Aspects to be Considered in the Emergency Phase and Beyond, 4
MALARIA J. 8 (2005), http://www.malariajournal.com/content/4/1/8 [http://perma.cc/
F42U.9KJ3] (archived Sept. 10, 2015).
83.
Eddy Rahardjo et al., Toward More Efficient Multinational Work on Rescue
and Aid for Disasters: Lessons Learned During the Aceh Tsunami and Yogya
Earthquake, 23 PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED. 301, 302 (2008).

84.
Costello, supra note 1.
85.
Matthew Hunt, Ethics Beyond Borders: How Health Professionals
Experience Ethics in HumanitarianAssistance and Development Work, 8 DEVELOPING
WORLD BIOETHICS 59, 63-65 (2008).
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were in "battle suits" rather than professional wear more associated
with the medical profession.86 While international responders were
generally lauded for their sensitivity in the highly conservative
Muslim areas during the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake, there was still
an issue of the 2,500 Cuban medical providers who "had no idea
where they were and asked us where to find rum. They were
unprepared in terms of clothing, had no warm clothes, often walked
around in inappropriate clothes, and would go to the river to wash in

public."

87

Finally, the international emergency medical community, even
among the established international providers, failed to provide a
coordinated and cohesive response even when such teams were
sought after by a disaster stricken country. A WHO Special Report
regarding medical provision following the 2004 Tsunami concluded
that beyond the issue of lost hours due to a lack of coordination
within the sector, the same impacted populations experienced
numerous repeated medical assessments by a wide variety of
organizations.8 8 In Indonesia, reports documented little information
exchange or coordination among international teams. 89 During the
2005 Pakistan Earthquake, the lack of coordination between the
Pakistani military and outside medical providers resulted in some
areas being flooded by field hospitals, while others had none.90 A
Doctors Without Borders team in Haiti also cited issues of uneven
coverage, thousands of patients left without post-operative care,
rudimentary referral systems, a lack of a common field reference
system, and weak recordkeeping.9 1

V. A FIRST STEP TOWARD PROFESSIONAL ORDER? WHO's FOREIGN
MEDICAL TEAM CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
The first substantive policy effort regarding international
medical relief standards pertained specifically to Foreign Field

86.

Rahardjo, supra note 83, at 302.

87.

ANDREW WILDER, FEINSTEIN INT'L CTR., PERCEPTIONS OF THE PAKISTAN

&

EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 29 (2008).
88.
Mukesh Kapila et al., Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, 20
PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED. 368, 370 (2005).
Rahardjo, supranote 83, at 302.
89.
90.
Esther Hicks & Gregory Pappas, Coordinating Disaster Relief After the
South Asia Earthquake, Soc'Y, July-Aug. 2006, at 45.
91.
Kathryn Chu et al., Improving Effective Surgical Delivery in
HumanitarianDisasters:Lessons from Haiti, 8 PUB. LIBRARY SCl. MED. 1, 1 (2011); see
also Anthony Redmond, A Qualitative and Quantitative Study of the Surgical and
RehabilitationResponse to the Earthquake in Haiti, January 2010, 26 PREHOSPITAL
DISASTER MED. 449-56 (2011).
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Hospitals (FFHs), issued by WHO and PAHO in 2003.92 Following the
highly complex and problem-riddled Haiti response, invested parties
in humanitarian health met under the auspices of WHO and PAHO
again for technical consultations in Havana, Cuba in December
2010.93 During this meeting, Foreign Medical Teams became the
official focus and point of reference, folding the previous issue of
FFHs into the larger discussion of professional, principled, and needsbased medical provision during disasters. 94 The meeting established
several key parameters for the subsequent policy dialogue on the
subject: (1) That the effort would focus specifically upon medical relief
following sudden onset disasters, and initially upon earthquakerelated response only; (2) that the professionalization process would
begin initially with a self-registration system but would ultimately
expand to include an accreditation mechanism and establishment of
minimum standards for FMTs; and (3) that the FMT framework
should be designed to support-not replace-the impacted
government and national health care systems. 95 The proceedings and
official annexes make repeated reference to the usefulness of the
INSARAG model in several of these areas. 96
The international policy momentum continued following the
Havana meeting, with particular attention being paid to the
organization of an FMT registry to address issues related to predeployment and on-site coordination amongst the teams themselves
and the host government. The proposal was further refined during
follow-up meetings by the WHO's Global Health Cluster (GHC) in
spring 2011, assuming a more specific focus on trauma care and
surgical teams and launching the formal creation of a "Foreign
Medical Teams Working Group" (FMT-WG) under the auspices of the
GHC. 97
Since its inception, the Working Group has made rather
impressive strides in getting the FMT initiative launched, with

92.
PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. [PAHO], WHO-PAHO GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF
FOREIGN FIELD HOSPITALS IN THE AFTERMATH OF SUDDEN-IMPACT DISASTERS 5-6 (July

8-10, 2013) [hereinafter FOREIGN FIELD HOSPITAL GUIDELINES], http://www.paho.org/
disasters/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=674&lang=en [http://perma.
cc/CV88-EVKN] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. [PAHO], PROCEEDINGS OF THE WHO/PAHO
93.
TECHNICAL CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAMS (FMTs) POST SUDDEN ONSET

DISASTERS (SODS) 2 (Dec. 7-9, 2010), http://www.paho.org/disasters/index.php?
option=comdoeman&task=doc view&gid=1761&Itemid= [http://perma.cc/6EGC-RAV9]
(archived Sept. 22, 2015).
94.
Id. at 3.
95.
Id.
96.
See id. at 6-7, 12, 17-18.
97.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], REGISTRATION AND COORDINATION OF
FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAMS RESPONDING TO SUDDEN ONSET DISASTERS: THE WAY

FORWARD 2 (May 5, 2013), http://www.who.int/hac/global-health-cluster/fmt-way
forward 5may13.pdf [http://perma.cclERE9-EMW6] (archived Sept. 22, 2015).
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stakeholders. The Group acknowledges that several forces help
advance the framework, including:
(1)
INSARAG's active
encouragement throughout the process, both in its sharing of
expertise and experiences related to registration and classification as
well as its ability to absorb FMTs into the already existing OSCOCC
and RDC mechanisms; (2) WHO's own corresponding efforts to
further strengthen its surge response strategy via its 2013
Emergency Response Framework document; and (3) the renewed
commitment by key players to further advance the cause of overall
coordination and professionalism in humanitarian relief through the
IASC's Transformative Agenda process launched in December 2011.98
In September 2013, the FMT Working Group issued the
inaugural set of FMT-related guidelines titled "Classification and
Minimum Standards For Foreign Medical Teams in Sudden Onset
Disasters." 99 This 103 page foundational document achieves what at
first appear to be modest goals. Yet, in reality, it is the first
substantive global effort to organize and professionalize the medical
sector outside the highly narrow subset of field hospitals and across
all types of teams, whether governmental or nongovernmental. From
the outset, it introduces a more meaningful definition for the term
"Foreign Medical Team." Rather than simply connoting a source of
medical provision originating outside the disaster impacted country's
borders, it becomes an official classification, "exclusively used for
those international medical teams that have registered and [agree] to
comply with the standards and principles," including having "staff to
provide basic and/or advanced healthcare based on international
classification levels and minimum standards during a limited time
period . . ."1oo Highly notably, the definition also directly addresses

the issue of unaffiliated volunteers: "Any individuals or groups that
do not fit within the definition and cannot comply with the standard
should either consider joining a recognized organization that provides
FMT or not responding in the aftermath of the sudden onset
disaster."1 01
This first edition of the classification/standards further
establishes that being recognized as a Foreign Medical Team means
that the unit assumes the responsibility of adhering to six "Guiding
Principles," including that care will be needs based and medically

Id.
98.
99.
See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], CLASSIFICATION AND MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAMS IN SUDDEN ONSET DISASTERS (2013),
[hereinafter CLASSIFICATION AND MINIMUM STANDARDS], http://www.who.int/hac/
global healthcluster/fmtguidelines-september20l3.pdf [http://perma.ccY9JB-9MUZ]
(archived Sept. 22, 2015).
Id. at 27.
100.
101.
Id.
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ethical, accountable, and collaborative.1 02 "Core FMT Standards"
specifically framed around the conduct of the response itself are also
delineated, ranging from the agreement to register with relevant
national and international authorities to ensuring self-sufficiency for
the entire duration of stay in country to making a commitment to
carry appropriate malpractice insurance.1 0 3
An opening effort at an FMT self-classification process is also
included. Segmented into three types, the classifications differ
depending on a variety of factors: whether the care is on an
outpatient or inpatient basis, level of complexity of care, number of
patients that can be cared for per day, hours of operation (day only or
twenty-four hour), whether or not they bring their own medical
structures, speed in deployment, and length of stay. 104 On the one
end of the spectrum, FMT Type 1 is outpatient based, emergency
medical care for at least one hundred patients. 0 5 The teams are
expected to deploy fastest to the site--between twenty-four and fortyeight hours-and are to be "light and portable." 06 They may or may
not rely on local facilities and are not expected to function on a
twenty-four hour basis.1 07 They are expected to stay within the
country ideally no more than a few weeks. 108 On the other end is FMT
Type 3, delivering "complex inpatient referral surgical care,"
possessing the competency to address thirty minor or fifteen major
surgical cases per day and have the means for 24/7 support and
monitoring, among other capabilities.1 09 These teams may establish
their own field hospital or integrate within local structures, but due
to their complexity, are not expected to be operational until five to
seven days following the disaster and will remain for a minimum of
two months.11 0 This latter requirement addresses previous concerns
especially raised in Haiti that many external individual surgeons or
teams provided the initial surgery but then departed so abruptly that
patients suffered with the lack of any specialized follow-up care.11
There is also one additional category titled "Additional Specialised
Care Teams," focusing on additional experts such as burn care or
dialysis.1 12 In this case, the teams must integrate within local or Type

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 34-43.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 34.
See id. at 35.
Id. at 36-37.

110.

Id. at 37.
See FOREIGN FIELD HOSPITAL GUIDELINES, supra note 92, at 31.

111.
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CLASSIFICATION AND MINIMUM STANDARDS, supranote 99, at 37-38.
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2 or 3 facilities with advanced approval of the host governing
authority.1 13
This classification process is entirely based on self-assessment by
the medical providers themselves, rather than linked to an external
peer review, an opening strategy that INSARAG also adopted.11 4 The
process to date works in a particular way. First, FMTs complete a
self-registration form with the WHO that confirms their capacity
related to the various classifications and their agreement to comply
with the expressed Guiding Principles and Standards. Registration,
however, does not in any way signify that the team may now
automatically proceed to a sudden onset disaster affected state. Next,
in order to participate in the relief response, the governing authority
of the impacted country must then provide authorization to provide
services "at their discretion."11 5
As is unfortunately often the case in the international
humanitarian assistance field, the new WHO FMT self-classification
process was put to the test within just a few short months of being
promulgated. In November 2013, devastating Typhoon Haiyan struck
the Philippines, widely considered to be the most powerful recorded
cyclone ever to strike land and taking over 6,000 lives.' 16 The
Philippine government actively promoted the FMT registration form
process on its embassy and consular websites worldwide and media
outlets serving the Philippine expatriate community also circulated
information related to the registration form and the need to obtain
authorization from Manila. 117 Signs were also posted on site
indicating that arriving teams should register.11 8
During a three month period following the disaster, 151 outside
medical contingents were documented as participating in the
response, with WHO's Country office registering the teams. 119 The

113.
Id. at 38.
114.
INSARAG HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 7.
See id. at 12-13, 29.
115.
116.
See generally Typhoon Haiyan-Nov. 2013, RELIEFWEB, http://reliefweb.
int/disaster/tc-2013-000139-phl [http://perma.cc/M5FL-MM2P] (archived Sept. 22,
2015).
117.
See, e.g., Advisory No. 7: Guidelines on the Acceptance of Foreign Medical
Teams, PHILIPPINE CONSULATE GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO (Nov. 25, 2013), http://
www.philippinessanfrancisco.org/news/3733/301/ADVISORY-NO-7-GUIDELINES-ONTHE-ACCEPTANCE-OF-FOREIGN-MEDICAL-TEAMS/d,phildet/
[http://perma.cc/G6
DN-AGK4] (archived Sept. 22, 2015); see also Guidelines Released for Foreign Medical
Teams Traveling to 'Yolanda' Areas, INQUIRERNET (Nov. 27, 2013, 8:20 AM),
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/92461/guidelines-released-for-foreign-medical-teams(archived
[http://perma.cclYH4J-69MR]
traveling-to-yolanda-areas#ixzz3ajqljtMY
Sept. 22, 2015).
118.
Hilarie Cranmer, Typhoon Haiyan and the Professionalizationof Disaster
Response, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1185, 1185 (2014).
119.
PhilippinesHealth Cluster Bulletin, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], May 16,
2014,
at 11, http://www.wpro.who.int/philippines/typhoon.haiyan/media/Haiyan.
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majority were Type 1 Primary Care teams, thirteen falling under
Type 2 classification and with only two in the more complex Type 3
category.120 Both Philippine government officials and outside
observers who participated in the relief operation were encouraged by
the initial results of the process.121
Yet the Haiyan case also demonstrates that profound and
significant issues remain related to international medical provision in
the wake of sudden onset disasters. Setting aside that just over half
of the FMTs did not register with WHO, this statistic solely
represents the teams that the government and WHO actually were
aware of, and within even that subset there remained a significant
paucity of information regarding the exact nature of their activities in
country.122 Internet blog postings by international medical
responders to Haiyan effectively capture the challenges that remain
for the WHO-FMT initiative. One team was literally on its way to
perform elective surgeries in Mexico when it changed course and
proceeded to the Philippines. One of its members wrote about their
complete lack of preparation for the trip:
Logistical obstacles were formidable: We had no flight, no visas, no official
permissions, no contacts on the ground or with any other NGOs aside from
Rubicon [who invited them spur of the moment to join their organization], no
security, none of the required or suggested vaccinations, no idea how we'd get
from Manila to the disaster area (if we could even get to Manila), nor what sort
of facilities we'd find, if any, once we got to wherever it was we needed to go.
What if half the group didn't want to go? What if we ended up stuck in an
123
airport terminal for a week? What if things turned violent?

Concerns also remain regarding the still significant delay in
team arrivals and what services will be useful by the time groups do
make it to a site. It was three weeks after Haiyan had struck before
the greatest number of FMTs were up and running. 124 Other postHealthClusterBulletinl9.16May2014.pdf?ua=1l [http://perma.cclDJU3-ZM2C] (archived
Sept. 22, 2015).
120.
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Action Review (August 12, 2014), http://www.healthpromo.doh.gov.ph/foreign-medicalteams-after-action-review-fmt-aar/ [http://perma.cc/JH8J-ZF9F] (archived Sept. 27,
2015).
122.
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CURRENT DISASTERS (May 5, 2015), at 10-11, http://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/
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disaster evaluations lamented the persistent pattern that the
international response continued to overwhelm, rather than
appropriately partner, with local health stakeholders12 5 and that the
suitable balance had not been struck between the full range of needs
of the impacted population (i.e., neo-natal services) as opposed to the
heavy emphasis on trauma surgery providers.12 6

VI. CONCLUSION

In endeavoring to both internally cultivate a set of professional
standards for its community as well as externally earn the good faith
of disaster affected states, the WHO's recent Foreign Medical Team
Classification and Registration schemes not only complement IDRL,
as the authors of the defining document state,127 but show promise in
becoming part of the International Disaster Response Law soft law
canon. While there are many substantive differences between the
USAR and emergency medical fields, including the wider variety of
actors involved on the medical side, domestic credentialing
requirements and the longer duration of in-country service, the FMT
journey to state recognition equal to INSARAG's shows early
potential. Future research following subsequent disasters such as the
various assessments post-Haiyan will be warranted to determine the
degree of national governments' and the medical sector's embrace of
the concept.
Currently, international disaster law's overarching normative
framework is to have national and local government authorities
reduce risk and fortify their domestic capabilities so that an
international disaster response will be decreasingly warranted over
time. However, in light of countries with extraordinary vulnerability
and economic constraints, such as Haiti, Pakistan, or Nepal, and on
the other end of the spectrum, the difficulties faced even by
economically prosperous countries such as the United States, Japan,
and New Zealand following their own natural disaster experiences, a
future without international disaster response is unfortunately very
far way. In the meantime, cross-border humanitarian relief will only
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be improved if governments of disaster-impacted countries, the
United Nations and the major relief sectors themselves strongly work
in tandem to enforce relevant standards and guidelines in the wake of
a sudden onset disaster.

